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Non-Technical Summary
While all companies will respond to taxation and capital market conditions with their
financing and investment decisions, multinational companies seem to have enhanced op-
portunities. In particular, they may be able to structure their internal finances in order to
save taxes. This channel of response to taxation has not only important implications for
the revenue consequences of tax policy, but may also shape the response of multinationals’
investment decisions to specific tax policy decisions.
This paper investigates the effects of company taxation and capital market conditions on
the financial structure of multinationals’ foreign affiliates. A theoretical model considers
the financing and investment decisions of a multinational corporation and derives empirical
implications. More specifically, we model a company, active in two countries, which has
the opportunity to use equity as well as external and internal debt. The theoretical model
shows that the effect of local taxes on leverage is positive for both channels of finance.
The empirical implications are then investigated using a micro-level panel database (MiDi)
provided by Deutsche Bundesbank of affiliates of German multinationals in 26 countries in
the period from 1996 until 2003. The panel data structure and the possibility to identify
all foreign affiliates belonging to the considered multinational allows us to control for the
heterogeneity across companies. A further advantage of the data is that under German tax
law repatriated foreign profits are almost completely exempt from corporation taxes such
that the taxes at the location of the affiliate are decisive for the financing and investment
decisions. The empirical analysis of the capital structure choice of multinationals confirms
that the local tax rate exerts important effects on affiliate’s use of external as well as
internal debt. Moreover, while adverse local credit market conditions are confirmed to
reduce external borrowing, internal debt is increasing. This supports the view that the
two channels of debt finance are substitutes. Comparing our results with results in the US
case (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004) we find similar effects of taxation and credit market
conditions on capital structure. This suggests that the international tax regime with regard
to exemption vs. tax credit method has little impact on the tax sensitivity of finances.
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1 Introduction
Multinational corporations use not only external capital but also intercompany loans in
order to optimize their capital structure. This might contribute to a lower sensitivity of
investment decisions to differences in taxation across countries, and, in addition, aggra-
vates the adverse revenue consequences of tax planning for tax policy. While the impact
of taxes on finances is well established in the literature on corporation taxes (see Auer-
bach, 2002, and Graham, 2003, for a survey), the multinationals’ choice of the capital
structure has only recently been addressed in the empirical literature. For Canadian-
and US-controlled firms Jog and Tang (2001) found a significant impact of tax rate dif-
ferentials between Canada and the US. For a sample of US controlled affiliates Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2004) show that especially internal borrowing of US corporations is
sensitive to taxation. It is, however, not obvious whether these results can be generalized
to other countries where multinationals are not subject to a tax credit system. The cur-
rent paper considers the impact of taxes on the capital structure of German corporations
for which, as is typical for EU countries, repatriated foreign profits are basically exempt
from corporation taxes.
2 Theoretical Background
Following Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), corporations would generally favor debt,
since the tax shield from deductible interest expenses increases the company value. In
order to explain why corporations nevertheless use equity, the literature uses alternative
theories (see Myers, 2001, and Auerbach, 2002). Generally, these theories stress the
trade-off between the gains from the tax shield through interest deductions and the
agency cost of debt, reflecting the inability to solve potential conflict between equity and
debt claimants by means of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Myers, 1977).
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To derive the optimal capital structure, consider the profit function for a multinational
pi = f (k1) (1− t1) + f (k2) (1− t2) (1)
− [i1λ1k1 + i2µ1k1] (1− t1)
− [i2λ2k2 + i1µ2k2] (1− t2)
− r [k1 (1− λ1 − µ1) + k2 (1− λ2 − µ2)]
− [c1 (λ1, µ1) k1 + c2 (λ2, µ2) k2] ,
where f (ki) denotes the output at location i where ki units of capital are employed. ti
is the local tax rate on capital income. The second and third lines capture the cost of
debt, where µi, λi denote the share of capital financed with internal and external debt,
respectively. Internal debt is remunerated at the other location’s interest rate.1 While
the fourth line contains the opportunity cost of equity, the last line captures the agency
cost of debt, which is not only increasing in both external and internal debt but also
convex cj,µµ ≡ ∂
2cj
∂µ2j
> 0, cj,λλ ≡ ∂
2cj
∂λ2j
> 0. If the cross-partial derivative cj,λµ ≡ ∂
2cj
∂λj∂µj
is positive, the two types of finance are substitutes, since the marginal agency cost for
each type of debt would increase if the other type of debt is used more heavily. We
further impose some regularity conditions cj,µµ >
∣∣cj,µjλj ∣∣ , and cj,λλ > ∣∣cj,λjµj ∣∣ such
that cross-effects are always dominated by the own effects.
The profit function assumes that the lending part of the multinational incurs debt in
order to finance the loan, implying that the required rate of return on equity is higher
than the net-of-tax cost of debt. This assumption is likely to be met if the lending part is
located in a high-tax country, such that there is little incentive to transform foreign into
domestic profits.2 We retain this assumption, since the empirical analysis is concerned
with the case of German multinationals, where the parent company is indeed located in
a high tax country.
1The company might have an incentive to set the interest rates above the market value, but we assume
that the arm’s length principle is effective.
2The alternative case is discussed by Mintz and Smart (2005).
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Given the profit function the optimum share of external debt incurred by affiliate 2 obeys
r − (1− t2) i2 = c2,λ (λ2, µ2) . (2)
The convexity of c2 implies that if r > (1− t2) i2, λ2 is positive. Thus, if the after-tax
return to capital is below the required rate of return on equity, there will be some external
borrowing. The optimum share of internal funds used at location 2 is determined by
r − (1− t2) i1 = c2,µ (λ2, µ2) . (3)
If the after-tax return to capital for intercompany debt is below the required rate of
return on equity r > (1− t2) i1, a part of the capital invested at location 2 is financed
with internal debt.
3 Data and Specification
The first-order conditions give rise to two basic testable relationships for the finances of
foreign affiliates of German multinationals. The comparative static properties, derived
in an appendix to this paper, suggest that external capital used at location j should
decline in the pre-tax rate of interest but increase in the local tax rate. With regard to
intercompany loans our analysis suggests that the amount of intercompany loans used at
a location is an increasing function of the local tax rate as it reduces the net-of-tax rate
of interest. Via its impact on external borrowing, however, also the local interest rate
will matter. Given these considerations, the same estimation equation can be used for
either type of leverage of an affiliate in country j held by a German multinational k in
period t
Yj,k,t = a0 + a1xj,k,t + a2tj,t + a3 log ij,t + ak + at + j,t,
where at is a time-specific and ak group-specific effect for all affiliates held by com-
pany k. Note that the former also captures the interest rate at the parent location as
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we consider only German multinationals. The company-specific effect encompasses the
company-specific opportunity cost of capital r which might also include elements of per-
sonal taxation at the level of the shareholder. xj,k,t captures further characteristics of
the subsidiary which affect the use of debt or the access to credit. As the lending rate is
difficult to measure we separate out its impact from that of taxes, captured by the tax
rate as an approximation to the log of unity minus tax rate.
The empirical analysis uses a Bundesbank database providing annual firm-level panel data
for the period 1996 to 2003. The collection of the data is prescribed by German law, which
determines reporting mandates for international transactions (Lipponer, 2006). Since the
model assumes a two-tier company structure, we focus on majority owned subsidiaries
and exclude indirectly held investment. Furthermore, as the underlying model deals
with a case where production takes place at each location, holdings and financial service
providers as well as observations with non-positive capital and turnover are excluded as
well.
In order to capture the tax incentive, the analysis employs the statutory tax rate on
corporate income modified by applicable restrictions on interest deductions. Thus, the
statutory tax rate represents the tax savings from deducting one unit of interest. Since
the effective tax reduction from using debt is zero if there is a loss carry-forward (MacKie-
Mason, 1990) a corresponding dummy variable is included. In the lack of information
about firm-specific interest expenses, we employ the lending rates for credit to the private
sector taken from the IMF, augmented, where possible, with ECB data. In order to
control for further variation in the lending conditions we employ turnover as an indicator
of size and cash-flow of the affiliate both of which will generally be positively associated
with the lending conditions. As agency cost may also vary across industries, we control for
further heterogeneity by including dummies for 71 industries at the level of the affiliate.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Capital (e 1,000) 31,258 175,776 112 15,200,000
Turnover (e 1,000) 52,486 370,006 1,000 51,900,000
External leverage .364 .250 0 1
Internal leverage .248 .250 0 1
Statutory tax rate .346 .068 .100 .532
Loss carry-forward .292 .455 0 1
Lending rate .075 .044 .027 .364
40,300 observations covering subsidiaries in 26 host countries in the eight years from
1996 - 2003. Tax rate and lending rate vary only by country-year cells
4 Results
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2 report estimation results for the ratio of external debt to the
affiliate’s total stock of capital. The results confirm a positive impact of taxes and an
adverse effect of local lending conditions on the leverage. The presence of a loss carry-
forward exerts a weak negative impact, indicating that a loss carry-forward either directly
reduces the gain from tax savings by debt finance, or, alternatively, that uncertainties
hamper access to credit. The positive sign of turnover in column (2) is in accordance
with the view that a larger size or cash-flow improves the access to external capital.
Column (3) shows that the results are robust if also industry dummies control for further
heterogeneity among affiliates. Columns (4)-(6) report results for internal debt. Again,
we find a significant positive effect of the statutory tax rate. After inclusion of controls
for industries and turnover, the coefficient is only slightly smaller than in the case of
external debt. The effect of the lending rate, however, differs, showing a positive effect
on the share of internal debt. This conforms with the view that external and internal
debt are substitutes. A substitutive relationship is further in accordance with the results
for the turnover, which exerts opposite effects on external and internal debt.
While the empirical results represent average effects, some affiliates report zero levels
of external and/or internal capital, where specific conditions may impede an interior
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solution. The results shown in the appendix are not much different.
The impact of local lending conditions is in accordance with Desai et al., who employ
indicators of the local credit market including the rate of inflation, measures of country
risk, creditor rights, and the size of the credit market. As shown in the appendix, the
empirical variation in the lending rate used in our analysis can be well predicted by
their measures. Consequently, alternative estimations using the predicted lending rate or
instrumental variable approaches obtained rather similar results.
Table 2: Results
Dependent variable Share of External Debt Share of Internal Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory tax rate .240 ? .177 ? .187 ? .135 ? .192 ? .153 ?
(.046) (.050) (.050) (.032) (.033) (.033)
(log)Lending rate -.042 ? -.035 ? -.037 ? .039 ? .032 ? .043 ?
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Loss carry-forward -.007 ? -.003 -.003 .059 ? .055 ? .059 ?
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004)
(log)Turnover .028 ? .027 ? -.025 ? -.016 ?
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Industry effects no no yes no no yes
R2 .029 .044 .052 .022 .032 .068
Company and time fixed effects included. Standard errors are robust against random
firm-specific and country effects using the usual Huber-White sandwich formula. An
asterisk denotes significance at 5% level. 40,300 observations, 4,115 firms.
With regard to the magnitude of the estimated effects, the results suggest that a 10
percentage point increase in the statutory tax rate on corporate earnings is associated
approximately with a 1.9 percentage point increase in the external debt ratio (column 3)
and a 1.5 percentage point increase in the internal debt ratio (column 6), taken together
the leverage increases by 3.4 percentage points.This is partly consistent with Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2005), who find that German multinationals respond almost exclusively
with internal debt. However, our results do support effects on external debt as well.
Comparing our results with Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) we find that the elasticity of
external borrowing implied by the point estimate is rather similar. Evaluated at mean
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values of taxes and leverage, the elasticity of external borrowing is 0.18 in the German
case compared with 0.19 in the US case. The elasticity of internal borrowing in the
German case is, however, only 0.21 as compared to 0.35 in the US case.
5 Conclusions
The empirical analysis of the capital structure choice of multinationals confirms that the
local tax burden exerts important effects on the affiliate’s leverage. This refers not only
to external debt; our findings indicate that a higher local tax rate is also associated with
an increase in internal debt. This shows that multinationals have access to an additional
instrument which can be used to exploit the tax savings opportunities of debt finance.
The failure to find a higher tax sensitivity in the German as compared to the US case
indicates that the international tax regime with regard to tax exemption vs. tax credit
has little impact on the tax sensitivity of finances. This suggests that the foreign tax
credit may actually be alleviated by deferred repatriation of profits (e.g., Hines and Rice,
1994, Altshuler and Grubert, 2003, Grubert, 2003) or other forms of tax planning.
A final remark is in order on the potential role of constraints such as thin-capitalization
rules. Given the existence of such rules, the tax sensitivity of the capital structure might
be underestimated to some extent. The analysis of the consequences of those constraints
is, however, left for future research.
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Appendix
Comparative Static Effects
We can derive the comparative static properties by differentiating the system of the two
first-order conditions which we obtained from our profit function.[
i2dt2 − (1− t2) di2
i1dt2 − (1− t2) di1
]
=
[
c2,λλ c2,λµ
c2,λµ c2,µµ
] [
dλ2
dµ2
]
Solving for the respective channel of finance we can state the corresponding comparative
static effects. Let us consider first the effects of the interest rate on external debt
dλ2
di2
= (1/ |H|) (− (1− t2) c2,µµ) < 0, (4)
where the determinant of the Hessian |H| is positive given the regularity assumptions
about the cost function.3 Thus, the expression is unambiguously negative, indicating
that an increase in the local interest rate causes a reduction in the external leverage.
With regard to internal debt we obtain
dµ2
di2
= (1/ |H|) (+ (1− t2) c2,λµ) ≷ 0. (5)
Assuming that the two types of debt act as substitutes (c2,λµ > 0) the expression is
positive, indicating that an increase in the local interest rate causes an increase in inter-
company debt. Making use, once more, of the imposed regularity conditions we note that
the direct impact on external borrowing (4) always dominates and total leverage declines.
Furthermore, let us consider the effects of the tax rate
dλ2
dt2
= (1/ |H|) (i2c2,µµ − i1c2,λµ) ≷ 0. (6)
Given the two types of debt act as substitutes (c2,λµ > 0), the sign is ambiguous. But
if the interest rate at the parent location is not much higher than the interest rate at
the affiliate, the derivative will be positive: higher taxation leads to a higher leverage.
Similarly, for the intercompany loans:
dµ2
dt2
= (1/ |H|) (i1c2,λλ − i2c2,λµ) ≷ 0. (7)
If the interest rates differ not much, higher taxation also leads to a higher leverage related
to intercompany loans.
3 cj,µµ >
∣∣cj,µjλj ∣∣ , and cj,λλ > ∣∣cj,λjµj ∣∣
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Outbound FDI
Observations Capital Share of Share of Share of
(e 1,000) Debt Ext. Debt Int. Debt
Destination Country Number Percent Mean Mean Mean Mean
Australia 852 2.11 17,715 .619 .303 .316
Austria 2,601 6.45 25,318 .605 .380 .225
Belgium 1,666 4.13 43,044 .634 .381 .253
Canada 679 1.68 31,141 .541 .316 .225
Czech Republic 2,180 5.41 25,151 .623 .360 .264
Denmark 765 1.90 18,844 .656 .404 .253
Finland 304 0.75 19,589 .566 .325 .240
France 4,861 12.06 27,890 .646 .405 .241
Great Britain 3,312 8.22 29.949 .560 .350 .246
Greece 404 1.00 22,245 .651 .373 .278
Hungary 1,368 3.39 36,191 .564 .335 .229
Ireland 331 0.82 19,575 .502 .279 .224
Italy 3,305 8.20 28,951 .720 .439 .282
Japan 954 2.37 54.095 .672 .460 .211
Luxembourg 58 0.14 17,254 .702 .496 .206
Mexico 562 1.39 62,787 .512 .245 .267
Netherlands 2,133 5.29 28,528 .576 .336 .240
New Zealand 116 0.29 11,101 .536 .269 .267
Norway 327 0.81 26,060 .605 .345 .260
Poland 2,533 6.29 19,448 .610 .341 .269
Portugal 317 0.79 24,813 .562 .344 .218
Slovakia 448 1.11 28,476 .566 .328 .238
Spain 2,739 6.80 33,263 .607 .379 .227
Sweden 934 2.32 20,638 .614 .339 .274
Switzerland 2,610 6.48 18.674 .549 .367 .182
USA 3,941 9.78 57,781 .583 .300 .283
Total 40,300 100.00 31,258 .612 .364 .248
Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample covering German outbound FDI in the
period from 1996 until 2003. The list of host countries includes 26 countries, 14 of
these countries are EU members in the period analyzed.
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Table 4: Results for Non-Zero Observations
Dependent variable Share of External Debt Share of Internal Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory tax rate .225 ? .154 ? .165 ? .124 ? .201 ? .161 ?
(.047) (.051) (.052) (.034) (.034) (.035)
(log)Lending rate -.050 ? -.042 ? -.045 ? .050 ? .038 ? .048 ?
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.005)
Loss carry-forward -.012 ? -.007 ? -.008 ? .061 ? .056 ? .059 ?
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004)
(log)Turnover .031 ? .030 ? -.034 ? -.024 ?
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Industry effects no no yes no no yes
R2 .034 .055 .064 .026 .045 .081
Empirical results for observations with non-zero debt only. The sample size is reduced
slightly. Company level and time fixed effects included. Standard errors are robust
against random firm-specific and country effects using the usual Huber-White sandwich
formula. An asterisk denotes significance at 5% level. 35,469 observations, 3,761 firms.
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Table 5: Determinants of the Lending Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation 1.03 ? .691 ? .692 ? .667 ?
(.058) (.068) (.068) (.071)
Country risk 2.47 ? 2.25 ? 2.37 ?
(.476) (.502) (.526)
Private credit -.004 -.000
(.003) (.004)
Creditor rights -.195 ?
(.098)
R2 .770 .808 .810 .816
Determinants of the lending rate for the panel of 26 host coun-
tries from 1996 to 2003. Inflation is taken from World Eco-
nomic Outlook Database. Country risk is an index provided
by the German investment credit insurance agency which ranks
from 1 (low risk) to 7 (high risk). Private credit represents the
ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP in %
taken from World Development Indicators as provided by the
World Bank. The Creditor rights index is also taken from the
World Bank. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicat-
ing that the risk to the creditor is lower. Standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity. An asterisk denotes significance
at 5% level. Time dummies are included. 184 observations
covering 26 countries over 8 years.
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Datasources and Definitions
Data for foreign affiliates of German multinationals are taken from the MiDi database
of the German Bundesbank. The dataset is augmented with time varying information
for 26 countries, 14 of these countries are EU members in the period analyzed. This list
of countries includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and USA.
Corporation tax data are taken from the IBFD, Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG. The tax
rate employed contains statutory profit taxes modified by applicable general restrictions
on interest deductions. The source of lending rates is the IMF, see above.
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